1.
In recent years, certain groups concerned with the potential effects of global climate change have urged colleges and universities to divest from securities associated with companies that explore for, produce, market and/or exploit fossil fuels. While a few universities have divested (either in whole or in part), most others have chosen not to do so and many have noted that divestment is likely to have little impact (financial or otherwise) on fossil fuel companies, while creating the potential for endowment shortfalls due to a lack of investment diversification and other costs. 2 1.
My credentials are described in Appendix A. I have been assisted in preparing this report by members of Compass Lexecon's professional staff. This study has been commissioned and financed by the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA).
2.
See, e.g., Andrew Karas (2013) "Swarthmore Pegs Cost of Divestment at $200 Million Over 10 Years," Swarthmore Daily Gazette May 9, 2013, http://daily.swarthmore.edu/?p=20404, ("The estimate … hinges on the argument that fund managers will refuse to select investments based on a particular client's company-by-company preferences. Dropping these fund managers, the College's endowment would have to be invested in special fossil fuel-free index funds, which are predicted to perform $200 million worse over the next ten years than the College's current investments.") See also Jenna Butz (2014) "UT Rejects Proposal for Fossil Fuel Divestment," The Daily Beacon [University of Tennessee], January 23, 2014, http://dailybeacon.webfactional.com/news/2014/jan/23/utrejects-proposal-fossil-fuel-divestment/, (quoting letter from Board of Trustees stating, "Last year, 90 percent of the endowment's payout went to supportive scholarships, instruction, and research. Eliminating a broad segment of the market from investment could hinder future funding of these endeavors.") See also Jeffrey A. Sine (2014) "Memorandum re: Fall 2014 Board of Trustees Meeting --Sustainability & Fossil Free Discussion and Decision," American University, November 21, 2014, http://www.american.edu/trustees/Announcement-November-21-2014.cfm, ("The committee asked the university's investment advisors, Cambridge Associates, to review how divestment from the Carbon 200 would impact risk adjusted investment returns. The Cambridge advisors could not provide assurance that divestment was unlikely to have an adverse effect. Moreover, divesting from these companies would require that AU investments be withdrawn from index funds and commingled funds in favor of more actively managed funds. Cambridge has estimated this withdrawal would cause manager fees to double, increasing from $1.1 million to $2.2 million per year.") See also Cheryl R. Holland (2013), Letter from Bryn Mawr Board of Trustees, August 2013, http://news.brynmawr.edu/files/2013/08/August_27_2013BMCDivest-1.pdf, ("While divestment would hurt the College financially, we don't believe it would have any impact on the companies targeted by your proposal.")
A recent study by my colleages at Compass Lexecon examined, among other issues, the costs to investors from fossil fuel divestment. 3 Based on a 50-year history of returns, that study concluded that the reduction in diversification associated with excluding energy securities from an average equity investor's portfolio would generate shortfalls of 50 basis points per year on a risk-adjusted basis, or 70 basis points per year on a gross basis. 4 Over a 50-year time frame, the value of a divested portfolio would be 23 percent lower than a non-divested portfolio. 5 These costs of reduced diversification are in addition to other costs of divestment, such as transaction costs associated with selling and buying securities and the costs of compliance with fossil fuel divestiture goals, both of which are often material as well.
3.
Basic financial economics principles indicate that excluding classes of securities from an investment portfolio -particularly major classes like energy sector securities -will always reduce diversification and hence, generate at least some expected shortfall (on a riskadjusted basis) relative to a portfolio without these exclusions (in addition to the transaction and compliance costs of divestment). 6 The Compass Lexecon study discussed above estimated the costs for an equity investor who held the "market portfolio," i.e., the average equity investor in the market. 7 But the magnitude of the shortfall experienced by a particular investor will depend on the particular types of securities held in the investor's portfolio before divesting.
4.
In this study, I provide more tailored estimates of the costs of divestment for five 11. In Section II, I describe the methodology for selecting proxy portfolios and for estimating the cost of divestment. In Section III, I present the results of this methodology applied to actual data from the five universities and describe the potential effects of divestment.
In Section IV, I respond to common objections regarding such calculations made by divestment activists.
II. METHODOLOGY

12.
I first reviewed the most recently published endowment reports for each of the five universities. 9 These reports do not provide information on specific holdings; however, they do provide information on the general asset classes in which endowment funds are held. I identified seven key asset classes (plus cash) that appear in these five universities' endowment reports, and these are indicated in Exhibit A.
13.
For six of the seven asset classes, I identified the three largest (according to assets under management) existing mutual funds in the U.S. that focus on securities in that asset class.
Because I am interested in observing the long-term returns from these funds, I restricted the set of proxy funds to those that have existed for at least 20 years (since March 1995). Survivorship bias is unlikely to have a material effect on our results, since we focus on the difference between the returns of these proxy funds and the returns of otherwise-equivalent divested funds. performed a similar search for proxies in the case of the "Absolute Return" asset class. Because this asset class is typically benchmarked to hedge fund returns, I used three major hedge fund indexes to proxy for returns, also reported in Exhibit A. Finally, for the "Cash and Cash
Equivalents" category, I used a single proxy for returns, namely, 3-month U.S. Treasury Bills.
14.
Morningstar provides periodic historical information on the detailed holdings of each of the three funds considered in each asset class. Because these funds are well-diversified, identified the subset of securities held by the fund that are associated with the coal, oil, and natural gas industries. These are the securities that I will remove to simulate the effect of divestment.
15.
Coal, oil, and natural gas securities are identified by CUSIP information provided by Morningstar, linked to industry codes using standard securities databases. 11 Exhibit A reports the share of each fund that is identified with these industries. For the hedge fund indexes used to proxy for the "Absolute Returns" asset class, I assume no divestment; to the extent a university did divest from holdings in the Absolute Returns class, the actual impact of divestment may be larger than I estimate here.
16. Selecting one of three potential proxy funds for each of seven asset classes (plus one proxy for the "Cash and Cash Equivalents" class), there are 2,187 ( = 3 7 ) ways to construct a portfolio that includes assets in each class. I constructed each of these portfolios and weighted
11.
For each six-digit CUSIP (identifying a unique issuer for the security), I identified an SIC, GIC, or BIC code from the CRSP, Capital IQ, and Bloomberg databases. Energy industry SIC codes are 1200-1399, and 2900-2999. Energy industry GIC codes are 10000000-10999999. The Energy BIC code is 13, but not including subsector 1311. CUSIPs are available from Morningstar for 89 percent of holdings, and for such securities, I was able to identify industry information for 98 percent of equity securities and 97 percent of corporate bonds. 12 Columbia and NYU also provide information, but in some cases, it is only at the level of broader asset classes (e.g., the share of assets in "equities," without any break-out between domestic and foreign equities). In such cases, I imputed the allocations within these broader classes based on the simple average of actual allocations at Harvard, MIT, and Yale. Exhibit B reports the asset allocation of each school across the eight asset classes. March 2015, assuming a constant allocation across asset classes based on these weights (in other words, rebalancing the portfolio each year). I then calculate the average annual return over the same period for each portfolio, with coal, oil, and natural gas securities excluded (and with the portfolio value that would have been allocated to those securities re-allocated proportionally across all other assets in holdings). 14 18. Given the annual returns for a portfolio and the returns of the corresponding divested portfolio, I calculate the gross difference in returns due to divestment. However, this 12.
In the case of Harvard, only information on the university's "Policy Portfolio" (i.e., its target allocation) was provided. 13.
The footnotes to Exhibit B indicate cases in which allocations were imputed within broad asset classes. 14.
One could, of course, consider a wide range of alternative re-allocation approaches (including no reallocation at all) which are beyond the scope of this study. Some divestment advocates may propose re-allocation to certain alternative energy securities. Since the alternative energy sector is much smaller than the conventional energy sector, this will typically involve substantially overweighting alternative energy in a portfolio, and consequently limiting the diversification potential for the portfolio. In any case, most or all of the major U.S. alternative energy securities have only existed for a few years, and so it is not possible to fully evaluate their riskreturn profile and their effects on diversification based on historical evidence. Moreover, it is far from a simple task to clearly identify "green" securities, and attempts to do so may incur non-trivial compliance costs. See Fischel (2015) op. cit., at ¶ ¶ 25-37. gross calculation does not account for differences in risk between the two portfolios. To the extent that a university divests, but then adjusts its portfolio to maintain the previous level of risk, it is a risk-adjusted difference in return that is more relevant. To calculate a risk-adjusted measure, I first calculated the volatility of the excess returns of each portfolio and its corresponding divested portfolio (relative to a three-month Treasury Bill) over the 20-year period. I then re-allocated a portion of the divested portfolio to three-month Treasury Bills so that its volatility matches that of the non-divested portfolio (if the non-divested portfolio was more volatile, then this involved leveraging the divested portfolio by borrowing at the three month Treasury Bill rate). I then compared the returns of these two portfolios to estimate a riskadjusted difference in returns due to divestment.
III. RESULTS
19. I applied the methodology described above to each university separately, as well as to a hypothetical endowment fund that encompasses all five universities (in other words, a weighted average across the five universities). For each university or the weighted average, I
ranked the 2,187 constructed portfolios according to the calculated shortfall due to divestment, 
25.
Sizeable declines in the endowment fund like those indicated in Exhibit C would likely have material impacts on a university's ability to achieve its institutional goals.
Specifically, endowments fund a material share of the operating budget for all five universities, and reductions in returns specifically harm key institutional objectives, such as funding research and student support, as illustrated in the following facts:
 Columbia. "The current endowment spending rule is based on two factors: first, the market value multiplied by a 5 percent target spending rate, which provides a response to market conditions; and second, the prior year's spending plus inflation, which ties spending increases to operating needs and cushions spending against market volatility … In addition to the base spending rate described above, two additional payout components were approved as temporary measures by the Trustees in 2008. The first is an increase in annual spending of up to 1.75 percent of the prior year beginning market value of endowments that are designated for undergraduate financial aid support … The second component is 0. Of course, an endowment fund faced with a shortfall due to divestment could allocate additional funds to the operating budget in order to keep critical accounts like research and student support funded at current levels, but this would require the endowment fund to reduce its allocation to other activities and/or require reductions in the principal of the fund, leading to lower long-term investment returns.
27.
A conclusion that a reduction in investment returns would have a harmful effect on the university is consistent with the general academic literature on university endowment funds, which finds that negative endowment returns lead to substantially lower payouts to fund university operations. One recent study concluded that "a 10 percent negative endowment return is associated with an 8.2 percent reduction in payouts." 22 The same study further found that " [a] negative endowment shock equivalent to 10 percent of a university's budget leads to a 4.9
17.
MIT, "Report of the Treasurer," op. cit., at 1.
18.
Id., at 4.
19.
New York University Investments Office, "Frequently Asked Questions," http://www.nyu.edu/about/leadership-university-administration/office-of-the-president/office-of-theexecutivevicepresident/finance-and-budget/investment-office. percent reduction in the number of tenure-system faculty during the following year … In addition to reducing tenure-system faculty, universities react to negative shocks by also cutting support employees (e.g., secretaries) and to some extent maintenance employees." 23 28.
Therefore, based on either the actual historical patterns of funding by these universities or the academic literature, it seems clear that a reduction in endowment fund returns as a consequence of divestment would have material impacts on an endowment's ability to fund a university's key institutional goals.
IV. RESPONSES TO COMMON OBJECTIONS
29.
My analysis of the impact of divestment is based on the historical evidence of the last 20 years. Some divestment advocates argue that the future of the coal, oil, and gas sectors is not as bright as it has been in the past due to regulations or other market changes that will cause these firms to "strand" certain assets or otherwise experience lower profitability. I have no specific view about the likelihood of such outcomes, but as a criticism of my study, such speculation misses the point. My calculations of the declines in risk-adjusted returns depend on the historical ability of securities in the oil, gas, and coal sectors to hedge other securities. They do not depend critically on any claim that absolute returns in these sectors will be as high as they have been in the past.
30.
In any case, it seems far from clear that, even as a speculative investment, oil, gas, and coal securities collectively are likely to be poor investments. First of all, even if the divestment advocates are correct that regulatory or market pressure on these firms will increase, it is very often the case that new regulations make the incumbent firms in an industry more
23.
Id., at 933-34.
profitable, not less so. This is because, even though compliance with regulations is costly, it also can serve to restrict entry and limit competition. 24 Moreover, firms can and do respond to regulations and changes in the market to maintain profitability, particularly when those regulations or changes are known well in advance, as divestment advocates claim they are.
31.
In any case, if reductions in profits are in fact as likely as divestment advocates claim, that fact should already be incorporated into lower current security prices, so that future investment performance would not be improved by selling these securities.
32.
Divestment advocates also claim that, whatever the costs of divestment, they are outweighed by the potential benefits of inducing changes at the companies in question that limit the effects of climate change. In fact, whereas divestiture has clear costs to the university is more likely to be cut is research and development into more speculative investments, such as those involving alternative energy. In this way, divestment advocates might actually accomplish exactly the opposite of what they hope to achieve.
34.
Some divestment advocates claim that, if prominent institutions like these universities divest, it will "send a message" to other market participants or governments that somehow spurs favorable action on climate change issues. Exactly how this would occur is unclear, and divestment advocates have not shown that divestment would not instead serve to polarize public debate further, nor have they shown that the market has reacted to past divestment announcements in ways they consider favorable to their goals.
35.
Finally, from an economic perspective, the problem of climate change is ultimately based on a concern that the prices of carbon-based fuels are too low because they fail to reflect the full social costs of burning hydrocarbons, which includes the harms of extreme climate change. It is clearly beyond the scope of this research to summarize the debate about the appropriate price of carbon-based fuels, but assume, hypothetically, that the appropriate price is, in fact, much higher than the current market price. There is a broad consensus among economists that the appropriate response to such a problem is a tax on burning carbon (known as a "Pigouvian tax"). 26 I understand that some large energy companies themselves support a carbon tax. 27 Policy advocacy along such lines would be far more fruitful than divestment, which as I have demonstrated, has substantial costs and only vague, highly speculative benefits. operated FinEcon, a financial economic consulting company, through which I also advised business and legal clients on financial economic issues. 
Exhibit C
2. Calculated as mean annual shortfall, extrapolated over specified time period.
1. Reflects average annual reduction in returns for a divested portfolio, relative to otherwise-equivalent undivested portfolio. Calculations are over 2,187 proxy portfolios for each university, constructed as described in the text. Gross shortfall is unadjusted difference in average annual returns. Risk-adjusted shortfall is based on same calculation, performed on portfolios with equalized volatility of excess returns, as described in the text. 
